



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 38 NUMBER 13

## The Sudan: Reasons for Military Coup

by John S. Badeau

A few days after General Ibrahim Abboud seized power in the Sudan from the government of Prime Minister Khalil on November 17, 1958, an American newspaper commented on the event in a cartoon. The picture showed Britain's Harold Macmillan and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser carrying the corpse of Sudanese democracy into a morgue, there to rest beside the defunct democratic governments of Iraq, Egypt, Burma and Pakistan.

Almost everything suggested by this drawing is wrong. There was little democracy to inter in the Sudan, for during the country's brief span of independence only a determined optimist would have labeled its government as a working democracy. Britain and Egypt, although partners in the old Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1953), were not directly responsible for the collapse of the Khalil government. And while military cliques rule Iraq, Burma, Egypt and Pakistan, the specific reasons for their rise to power were not the same as in the Sudan.

If the overworked clichés suggested by this cartoon do not explain the situation, what does? Looking back to a visit in the Sudan just before the coup, it is now apparent that

the basic elements leading to Abboud's action were then unmistakably present, although no one at the time predicted their swift consummation in the overthrow of the government.

The first of these elements was the Sudan's increasing conflict with Egypt, centered on the division of the Nile waters. The Sudan has not been in agreement with Egypt about their relationship since the British left the country in 1956. At that time, Egypt hoped that it could replace Britain's influence, but it was unexpectedly told by the Sudanese that since one member of the Condominium was leaving, the other would have to go too. The subsequent emergence of the Sudan as a fully sovereign nation touched Cairo's most vital concern—access to the use of the Nile, which reaches Egypt through Sudan territory.

The distribution of the Nile's waters has been governed by the agreement of 1929, which Egypt insisted should be the basis for new arrangements with the Republic of the Sudan. The Sudan, however, contended that this agreement had been signed during the period of "occupation," when it was not free, and was therefore not binding. It also objected to some of the agreement's basic prin-

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ciples of water division between the two countries. When the Sudan offered to negotiate a new pact, Egypt stipulated that the 1929 agreement must be accepted as the basis of discussions, but this the Sudan refused to do. The controversy was sharpened by the news on October 23, 1958 that Egypt, with Russia's financial aid, would proceed with the construction of the High Aswan Dam, which would draw on the Nile waters.

The Sudanese also resented Egypt's border claims, dramatically renewed on February 1, 1958, a few weeks before the Sudanese elections. No one has satisfactorily explained what Egypt hoped to gain by raising such a controversial question at that time. One suggestion is that the two areas in dispute offer the best harbor and airfield facilities for Egypt on the Red Sea. This may be important in view of the Egyptian-Yemen connection through the United Arab States. In any case, the claims exacerbated tension between the Sudan and Egypt.

### Economic Deterioration

To bring pressure on the Sudan, Egypt then started a quiet economic blockade of its neighbor. Egypt is the natural market for Sudanese cattle—and its purchases were suddenly greatly reduced. Sudanese employed in Egypt were treated as foreigners, and many lost their jobs.

The Sudan could not afford to let this impasse continue unresolved. The two countries had to reach some kind of agreement, for they are irrevocably linked by the Nile and by

their common economic interests. Their conflict, however, had reached the point where the Sudanese government feared that some pro-Egyptian group might attempt to seize power and thus offer Nasser a more pliable administration with which to negotiate. The alternative was to resist pressure—and this would mean increasing reliance on support by the West, which Britain and the United States had already begun to propose through loans and development programs. Yet in the Sudan, as elsewhere in the Arab world, too close an alignment with the West might have brought a violent internal reaction and further separation from its neighbors. One of the principal popular charges made against Premier Khalil had been that he was becoming the "Nuri Said" (or pro-Western leader) of the Sudan.

In this dilemma, a *coup d'état* could clear the way for a new approach to negotiations with Egypt, since it would remove from office the government involved in the impasse. There is reason to believe that Prime Minister Khalil was party to Abboud's action, and if so, the consideration just suggested was probably a major reason for the coup.

A second element in the situation was the increasing deterioration of the Sudan economy. Not only did the country feel the pressure of Egypt's unofficial boycott, but its cotton sales were at a critical stage. After the Suez crisis, the Sudan believed that Egyptian cotton would encounter difficulties in the world market and therefore assumed that

it had something of a corner on sales of long-staple cotton. While Egypt reduced its price to stimulate sales, the Sudan maintained a high price level, only to find out that it could not sell its cotton crop. Moreover, European spinners found ways to use American long short-staple cotton in the place of Egyptian and Sudanese short long-staple fibres. This further reduced Sudan cotton sales. Then India added to the problem by failing to buy as much Sudanese cotton as had been expected, due largely to its shortage of foreign exchange. By November 1958, one-fifth of Sudan's 1957 crop and almost half of the 1958 crop were still unsold.

### Foreign Loans Sought

While cotton is not as dominant in the Sudan's economy as in that of Egypt, it is one of the country's most important sources of foreign exchange. The unexpected collapse of cotton sales therefore seriously affected the Sudanese economy as a whole, and I found businessmen bitterly complaining about the economic unrealism of their government. An indication of this problem is the fact that the Sudan gold and foreign currency reserves shrank from \$177,940,000 (1956) to \$80,360,000 (May 1958) and the government has been driven to seek foreign loans from every possible source to bolster its position.

A third element was the increasing irresponsibility of party political life. The Khalil government had started as a coalition between the country's

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## What Is the Truth About Missiles?

The "missile gap" debate in Washington is generating a lot of heat—but precious little light. One of the troubles, of course, is the lack of hard information; another is a surplus of speculation. The Central Intelligence Agency doubtless knows a great deal more than anyone else about Russia's missile capabilities. It does not know everything, however, and sometimes its reports are not only disputed but contradicted by other intelligence and even by events.

The principal source of dispute over the "missile gap"—its depth and danger—comes from the fact that the disputants seldom seem to talk about the same thing. For example, one group, which we might call the McElroys, after the Secretary of Defense, insists on talking about missiles in general—lumping ICBM's and IRBM's together. The other group, which we might call the Symingtons, after the Senator from Missouri, who is the principal critic of Pentagon missile policy, talks only about ICBM's. Then, when the McElroys decide to debate the missile gap in terms of total East-West defense capability; the Symingtons want only to talk about comparative United States-U.S.S.R. missile strength. This kind of *non sequitur* debate can be not only wearisome but confusing, and the longer it lasts, the shorter tempers get.

Let us, then, try and break this debate down and discuss it point by point. The following analysis may oversimplify the issue, but it does clarify the subject.

First as to missiles. The Symingtons insist (and the McElroys agree) that the U.S.S.R. is ahead in ICBM's—intercontinental ballistic missiles (the long-range weapons capable of

striking the enemy at a distance of 5,000-6,000 miles or more). In fact, Secretary McElroy admits publicly and willingly that by 1962 the Russians will have a 3-1 lead over the United States in ICBM's, and says that the government has no intention of matching ICBM for ICBM.

This is the kind of attitude which makes the Symingtons see red. Russia will have an admitted 3-1 lead in ICBM's, they scream—and yet the Administration is doing nothing about it! By 1962, they assert, the United States will be at the mercy of the Russians.

### McElroys vs. Symingtons

But the McElroys refuse to panic. What if the Russians are ahead in ICBM's, they say. The United States can match them with IRBM's (intermediate range missiles) with ranges from 800-1500 miles. Also, they add, the United States has Polaris (a missile submarine) and, of course, there is SAC (Strategic Air Command).

Our IRBM's are better than those Russia has, the McElroys argue. They have greater range capability—1500 miles for Thor and Jupiter as against 800 miles for the Russian IRBM's.

The McElroys also have made it plain they do not want to be caught with an obsolete ICBM—which is what the Atlases and Titans (liquid-fuel missiles) would be in a matter of months. They want to perfect the Minuteman—a solid fuel ICBM, which can be fired from underground bases, requires no count-down, and uses smaller crews. A future ICBM ratio of 3-1 really does not alarm them.

The reason it does not alarm them is because of the second aspect of this

"missile gap" debate: total defense posture versus missile capability. The Administration, from President Eisenhower down, is convinced that in over-all defense posture the United States, and this means the West, is equal if not superior to the Soviet bloc. This means that while the U.S.S.R. could be ahead 3-1 in ICBM's come 1962, it would not be ahead in a total defense which included IRBM's, Polaris submarines, Hound Dogs (missiles which can be fired 500 miles from planes) and SAC.

One thing that is worrying the Symingtons, and has yet to be satisfactorily explained by the McElroys, is how it happened that the White House revised its estimates of Soviet missile capabilities downward just as it was submitting its balanced budget to the Congress. The coincidence is too neat, the Symingtons say, although the McElroys reject flatly any such interpretation of the chain of events.

Stripped of all the verbiage and disjointed debate which surrounds it, the "missile gap" debate really centers on this difference: the Symingtons insist that whatever the relative defense positions of the two sides, taking everything into consideration, it would be a disaster to let the Russians get a 3-1 lead in ICBM's. The McElroys retort that America's family of weapons is more than a match for the U.S.S.R.

This "missile gap" issue has become the capital's great debate this session of Congress, although many observers here believe another aspect of defense could be more immediately dangerous—and that is the nation's ability to fight limited wars.

NEAL STANFORD





## The New Technology—for Destruction or Plenty?

If man were reasonable, the 20th century would go down in history as the century when mankind achieved the greatest measure of plenty in all the things ever known that make for a "good life." Instead, all of us—the technologically advanced and the technologically backward, the believers and the atheists, those who practice democracy and those who practice communism—find ourselves teetering on the edge of what could be the greatest destruction known on earth.

Today mankind is in a position to reap the rich harvest sown by countless scientific achievements over the centuries. We are able to pierce the secrets of outer space and to penetrate the depths of oceans. We can explore new frontiers in atomic energy, in the control of diseases which had proved beyond our power to cure, in the discovery of sources of raw materials and foods which had hitherto been untapped. Here is only a sampling of a few significant items reported by the American press since the first of the year:

### Weather—Health—Food

*Item 1.* On February 17 the United States launched into orbit a scientific satellite which will serve, not to destroy mankind, but as man's first weather observation station in space. A few hours after the 21.5-pound spherical satellite, 20 inches in diameter, was launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida, by the Navy's Project Vanguard, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration predicted that the satellite would remain aloft for decades and perhaps even for centuries. Inside the satellite is scientific equipment designed to provide the first pictures of the earth's cloud

cover from the vantage point of space. The satellite, which will serve as a meteorological observatory, ushers in a new era of global forecasting of the earth's weather.

*Item 2.* In an international gesture of good will a U.S. Navy hospital ship, it was announced on February 7, is to be outfitted as a floating medical school for a year-long visit to the countries of Southeast Asia. The Navy will take the aptly named ship, *Consolation*, out of mothballs and supply it without charge. The American President Lines will operate the ship at cost, with union labor.

This project, designated as HOPE, represents the response of a group of physicians to a call by President Eisenhower to private citizens for "people to people" promotion of good will between the United States and other nations. It will be sponsored by the People-to-People Health Foundation, which plans to raise funds from private sources. The *Consolation* will carry a staff of about 200 doctors and 200 nurses, and will be equipped with 800 hospital beds, laboratories and operating rooms. It will serve both as a medical school and as a center for medical treatment. The ship will visit only those countries to which it is invited by the medical profession.

Meanwhile, Senator Lister Hill, Democrat of Alabama, on February 2, reintroduced in the Senate his bill to expand United States support of international medical research. In a strong show of bipartisan support, 59 of Senator Hill's colleagues joined him in cosponsoring the legislation. A similar bill was reintroduced in the House of Representatives by Representative John E. Fogarty, Democrat of Rhode Island.

The proposed legislation, known popularly as the "Health for Peace" bill, would create within the National Institutes of Health a new National Institute of International Medical Research with an annual appropriation of \$50 million. These funds could be used to encourage and support research and the exchange of information on research, the training of research personnel and the improvement of research facilities throughout the world. A National Advisory Council for International Medical Research, composed of nongovernmental leaders, would establish policies, make recommendations and approve grants and loans under the program to American and foreign universities and research organizations and to international agencies such as the World Health Organization.

*Item 3.* On February 10 President Eisenhower named Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson to head the Administration's Food for Peace drive. As a part of the proposed program, the Administration is expected to call a world food conference in the autumn to consider surplus food problems, including better distribution of foodstuffs throughout the world and the possibility of establishing depots for surplus foods.

*Item 4.* At the 6th International Planned Parenthood Conference held in New Delhi in February, Homi J. Bhabha, chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, proposed the development of a substance that could be mixed with the daily diet to reduce the conception rate by almost 30 percent, and thus provide a check on the astronomical rise in population which alarms

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## U.S. Analysis of Soviet Note on Berlin

The following excerpts, which appeared in *The New York Times* of January 8, are from the Department of State booklet *The Soviet Note on Berlin: An Analysis*, (Washington, D.C., U.S.G.P.O., January 1959, 25¢). The booklet can be obtained from the World Affairs Center Book Department, 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y.

On November 27, 1958, the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics handed the United States ambassador in Moscow a communication relating to Berlin.

Similar notes were given by the Soviet government to the ambassadors of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

In essence the Soviet notes demanded that the United States, the United Kingdom and France abandon West Berlin.

In its note the Soviet government has rewritten history and presented an account of the past which persons who have lived through the periods discussed will find difficult to recognize. Alterations have been effected in two ways—by omission and by distortion.

The succeeding pages aim to supply the more important Soviet omissions and correct the more obvious distortions contained in the Soviet note . . .

### Developments Before World War II

#### *Soviet Allegations*

The Soviet note states that prior to World War II the Soviet Union displayed constant willingness to establish cooperation with the other powers with the object of resisting Hitlerite aggression and that, if the Western powers had not been shortsighted in their hopes of turning Hitler eastward and had cooperated with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics millions of lives would have been saved.

#### *The Facts Are*

1. The U.S.S.R. established diplomatic relations with Germany in 1923 and assisted in building up a new German war machine which had been prohibited by the Versailles Treaty after World War I.

2. From 1930 to 1933 the Soviet Union, through its international Communist arm, the Comintern, directed the German Communist party to collaborate with the Nazis and other extremists in undermining the German Weimar Republic. It helped sabotage democratic parties and institutions and promoted lawlessness and disorder. This aided Hitler's rise to absolute power.

3. In 1933, after Hitler came to power, the U.S.S.R. and Germany exchanged ratifications of an extended neutrality pact.

4. The U.S.S.R. signed six credit and commercial agreements with Germany between 1922 and 1933. During Hitler's ascendancy after 1933 the U.S.S.R. concluded 12 more agreements with the Nazi regime at the time when Hitler was building up his military power.

5. The U.S.S.R. turned aside from negotiations with the United Kingdom and France in August 1939, and concluded the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreements which provided the necessary guarantees for coordinated Nazi-Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe and resulted in World War II.

6. In spite of warnings from the Western powers of impending German attack, the Soviet government aided Nazi Germany until Hitler marched against it in 1941.

7. In April 1941, the U.S.S.R. signed a neutrality pact with the Japanese ally of Hitler, thereby clearing the way for the Pearl Harbor attack on the United States on December 7, 1941.

8. The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada provided large quantities of vital war materials to the U.S.S.R. during the war. This aid underscored prompt political support from the United States the day after Hitler attacked Russia in June 1941.

### World War II and Postwar Developments

#### *Soviet Allegations*

The Soviet note states that the Western allies had a "joint concerted policy" toward Germany in World War II. It maintains that, if these policies had been continued, as inaugurated by President Roosevelt, there would have been peaceful coexistence after the war. Instead, according to the Soviet note, the atmosphere was poisoned by Winston Churchill and others seeking an aggressive course against the U.S.S.R.

#### *The Facts Are*

1. In wartime agreements the Allied nations stated two fundamental policies: they pledged to defeat the enemy, and they declared they would strive for recovery from the war, continuing wartime cooperation.

2. A heavy price was paid to defeat the enemy.

3. Instead of implementing the wartime agreements, the U.S.S.R. proceeded to carry out its own plans for Communist expansion in Eastern

Europe and prevented or delayed wherever possible the actions of the Western powers to promote economic recovery in Germany and all of Europe.

4. These Soviet actions, which contradicted Soviet pledges, destroyed the good will felt for the U.S.S.R. and convinced Western governments of the need for defense against Soviet expansionism.

5. Stalin declared the "cold war" on the West in 1946 by asserting that the wartime alliance with the West was dictated by expediency. He predicted wars between capitalist states and said the Communists would achieve domination over other people.

### **Postwar Relations With Germany**

#### *Soviet Allegations*

The Soviet note charges the Western allies with violation of the political and economic provisions of the inter-Allied agreements, particularly the Potsdam agreement. It contends that these violations were a part of the Western "aggravation of the ideological struggle" and Western "war preparations." The Western allies, it says, worked actively to prevent the peaceful unification of Germany, and West Germany's leaders were militarists who made plans to unify Germany by force.

The note goes on to state that East Germany is governed under a constitution in "the finest progressive traditions of the German nation" and has made great "democratic and social gains." The Western powers, it states, used their presence in West Berlin to "pursue subversive activity" against Russia and the satellites, whereas, by contrast, the quadripartite agreement on Berlin was "scrupulously observed by the Soviet Union."

The note claims that, during the entire postwar period, despite aggravations and war preparations by the

West, the Soviet Union remained a firm supporter of policies of "peaceful coexistence," "noninterference" in the affairs of other states and respect for the "sovereignty and territorial integrity" of other countries . . .

#### *The Facts Are*

1. The stated purposes of postwar agreements between the allies on Germany were to eliminate vestiges of the Third Reich, to prevent rebirth of aggressive forces, and to chart a course by which Germany could recover its respect and play a constructive role in international affairs.

2. Long before the signature of the Potsdam protocol, embodying these principles, in August 1945, the U.S.S.R. began its efforts to turn Germany into a Soviet satellite. It selected, trained and repatriated individuals who later became the political and military leaders of the East German regime.

3. Before the Western powers occupied their sectors in Berlin, the Soviet army had licensed political parties and subjected them to control through traditional Communist mechanisms. These still obtain in East Germany today.

4. Nevertheless the victorious powers negotiated the Potsdam protocol, which contained both negative features (demilitarization, denazification, and reparations) and positive features (elected local governments, unified administration, democratic rights for all citizens, balanced economic treatment and an eventual peace treaty to settle the war). The U.S.S.R. refused to carry out these positive principles.

5. The United States did not wish Germany to become a Soviet satellite. It urged economic recovery in Europe as a whole.

6. The U.S.S.R. sidestepped an American proposal for a 40-year non-aggression pact guaranteeing against

a recurrence of German military aggression. The Soviets opposed economic recovery in Europe. They walked out of the four-power Allied Control Council for Germany and instituted the Berlin blockade in 1948 to try to force the Western allies out of the city.

7. In Berlin the Soviets forced the split in the city and set up a rump government in East Berlin to oppose the duly elected government of the city.

8. Despite the lack of Soviet cooperation, the Western powers proceeded to carry out the Potsdam protocol in their own zones in West Germany. Following free elections and the adoption of an approved basic law (constitution), the Federal Republic was established.

9. The Soviets proclaimed the so-called German Democratic Republic in 1949. No free elections have ever been held.

10. The Communists continue to prevent free circulation of information and to control movement of citizens in East Germany and between East and West Germany. They justify this action on grounds of preventing "fascist aggression" and "outside provocation" by "espionage agencies" in West Berlin.

### **Reparations**

#### *Soviet Allegations*

The Soviet note says the Western powers began to follow a policy in Germany counter to the provisions of the Potsdam protocol about a year after the war. The note specifies this was due to a heated ideological struggle which reversed wartime cooperation. It charges that the Western powers refused to give the U.S.S.R. reparations due from Germany.

#### *The Facts Are*

1. The Potsdam protocol provided that the U.S.S.R. should receive from the Western occupation zones 15 percent of specified types of such in-

Industrial capital equipment as was unnecessary for the German peace economy *in exchange for an equivalent* value of food and other raw materials plus an additional 10 percent without exchange. Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist *without external assistance*. It also provided that Germany should be treated "as a single economic unit."

2. The Soviet Union did *not* deliver food and other raw materials in return for large shipments of capital equipment from the Western zones.

3. The United States suspended reparations shipments because of the failure of the Soviet Union to implement the Potsdam protocol as a whole.

4. The Soviet Union continued to extract reparations from its zone at a time when the Western powers were forced to maintain a minimum economic level by financing imports to Germany. In effect, shipments of reparations to the U.S.S.R. at a time when the United States was supporting its own zone to make up deficiencies caused by Soviet violations of the Potsdam agreement amounted to the U.S.S.R.'s collecting reparations from the United States.

## Rearmament

### *Soviet Allegations*

The Soviet note says that the Western powers are rearming West Germany, encouraging and restoring the forces which had built up Nazi military power. The Soviets maintain that this is a violation of the Potsdam protocol and that the Soviet Union has been compelled to establish the Warsaw pact as a defensive system.

### *The Facts Are*

1. The United States in 1943, 1946 and 1947 proposed the negotiation first of a 25-year and later of a 40-

year treaty which would guarantee against resurgence of German militarism. The Soviet Union effectively killed the negotiations by dragging in numerous extraneous and controversial issues.

2. In the United States zone of Germany the United States carried out fully the demilitarization provisions of the Potsdam protocol by 1950.

3. Beginning in 1948 the Soviets built up a sizable "police force" in its zone, arming it with military-type weapons and having it trained by former German army officers.

4. In 1954 (a year before an army was established in West Germany)

140,000 German military personnel were under arms in the Soviet zone plus a police force of 100,000. At this time West German police numbered 150,000, although there are three times as many people in West Germany as in East Germany.

5. The military forces of the Federal Republic are integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has purely defensive purposes within the framework of the United Nations. The Federal Republic has renounced aggressive purposes and accepted specific limitations on armaments. The Western powers have repeatedly assured the Soviet Union on these points.

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## Spotlight

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Communist China as much as democratic India.

## Nuclear Conference Stalled

In the midst of this ferment about improvements in food, health and weather observation, the nuclear tests conference of the atomic Big Three—the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Britain—continues, so far without success, to study the first steps toward averting the use of nuclear energy for the destruction of man and of the earth's resources. The United States and Britain have made two constructive proposals—to separate discussion of nuclear tests from that of disarmament in general (Washington had previously opposed this); and to set up inspection teams which, in each country, would be headed by an expert from another country—a Russian in the United States, a Britisher or American in the U.S.S.R. (Moscow continues to insist on national inspection teams with a few observers drawn from the other participating countries.)

The nuclear-tests discussion, how-

ever, was dampened by the United States announcement on January 5, 1959 that underground tests could not be easily detected, as the scientists of East and West had declared at the 1958 Geneva conference. This announcement seemed to dim the prospect of reliable control of tests. And a question, as yet unanswered, hovers over the conference: Can any control and inspection system be established without the cooperation of Communist China, whose government is not recognized by the United States and has not been admitted to the United Nations?

Nor is the slow pace of the Geneva negotiations surprising; for there the three nations with atomic weapons are discussing their military security as well as the world's survival. But as the technological race for destruction or plenty continues, it becomes increasingly clear that political statesmanship has yet to catch up with scientific development if new techniques are to be mastered for peaceful purposes.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The seventh of nine articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1959"—Reshaping Foreign Policy Amid Revolutions—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)



## Badeau

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two major parties—but this partnership did not last very long. Ismail el Azhari finally withdrew his National Union party from the coalition and went into opposition. But opposition in the Sudan soon turned into complete disagreement with the government on every issue, making any constructive legislation almost impossible.

A good example of this is the treatment given to the United States economic aid agreement. This agreement, concluded in July 1958 after sharp parliamentary debate, at once became the principal target of the Opposition, who tried to make it a popular rallying point against the government. Symbolic of how far matters had gone was an incident which occurred on the Sunday, October 19, that I was in Khartoum. A group of ministry employees, on strike against their own government in a wage dispute, held a demonstration in the heart of the city. The banners they bore did not attack Premier Khalil and his cabinet, but carried slogans calling on the United States Economic Mission to "go home." Yet Ismail el Azhari himself is reported to have told American representatives that the agreement was basically sound and in the best interests of the Sudan. When asked,

"Why then do you and your party so bitterly oppose it?" his reply was, "Because we are the Opposition and the Opposition must oppose everything the government does!" This concept of party life, given free rein, inhibits any effective government program and destroys whatever democratic political life there may be.

Abboud's coup was thus in the interest of more efficient government, as well as a possible prelude to a settlement of relations with Egypt. As in many other newly "democratic" countries, the machinery of Western parliamentary life had led to a situation where neither foreign policy nor domestic development could be adequately directed. Whether or not a military group can now do any better remains to be seen.

Dr. Badeau, president of The American University at Cairo 1945-53 and now president of the Near East Foundation, has written previously for the *FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN* and is author of *Headline Series* No. 98, "The Emergence of Modern Egypt." His latest book is *The Lands Between* (New York, Friendship Press, 1958).

## FPA Bookshelf

### U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Constructive criticisms of U.S. foreign policy are offered by an Associate Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin, William Appleman Williams, in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland, World Book, 1959, \$4.75), and by a well-known newspaper commentator, C. L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times*, in *What's Wrong with U.S. Foreign Policy*

(New York, Harcourt, 1959, \$4.50). Both books should prove useful at a time when the Executive, Congress, and the public are reappraising this country's course in world affairs.

C. Wright Mills, widely noted for his book, *The Power Elite*, gives a keen and provocative analysis of what he regards as current trends toward the shaping of another holocaust in *The Causes of World War Three* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1958, \$3.50). In *Rice Roots: An American in Asia*, Arthur Goodfriend, now public affairs officer for the USIA in New Delhi, eloquently pleads for better people-to-people understanding of Asians by Americans (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1958, \$3.95).

### BRITAIN

A distinguished French political scientist, André Mathiot, who believes that the British system is particularly effective in safeguarding individual liberty, analyses British politics and the various facets of government in *The British Political System* (Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1958, \$6.00).

*The Conditions of the Working Class in England*, by F. Engels, friend and collaborator of Karl Marx, is a new and very much improved English version of this work, translated and edited from the German by W. O. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner (New York, Macmillan, 1958, \$5.00). It is useful for its account of the conditions under which English factory workers existed in the 1840's, even though the violent revolution prophesied for England never came to pass.

*Britain and Europe* (London, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 1957, \$2.10) is a comprehensive and competent study of the European Economic Community (the Common Market) and the Free Trade Area. The book provides an account of British industry in relation to that of Europe, and assesses the effect of Britain's participation in the Free Trade Area on its trade and production.

*Britain and the United Nations*, by Geoffrey L. Goodwin (New York, Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957, \$3.00) is another useful volume in the series prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International peace.

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MR. PAUL MANLEY  
17917 SCHENELY AVE.  
CLEVELAND 19, OHIO

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